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INTRODUCTION
We study the effect of limited observability on the possibility of cooperation in a simple overlapping generations model. We show that if new entrants can observe only the recent history of the game, then cooperation Ž . cannot be sustained for certain classes of games. Specifically, i if the Ž . stage game is one with a dominant action for the old player or ii if the stage game is a 2 = 2 symmetric game, then players play short-run best responses along the equilibrium path.
2
This result is in sharp contrast with the existing works on overlapping generations games, which prove that any feasible and strictly individually rational payoff vector can be supported as a repeated game equilibrium outcome as long as players live for sufficiently long periods and the 1 I thank a co-editor of this journal for helpful suggestions.
Ž . Bhaskar 1998 obtained a similar anti-folk theorem for the consumption loan model, which is a game with a dominant action. In contrast, we deal with general stage games.
Ž . discount factor is large enough. See, for example, Cremer 1986 , Salant Ž . Ž . Ž . 1991 , Kandori 1992 , and Smith 1992 . The divergence of the results in this paper from those in earlier works is due to the assumption of limited observability: Folk theorem results are derived under the assumption that each generation observes all the previous action choices, whereas the anti-folk theorems in this paper are derived under the assumption that each generation observes only the recent history of the game. The intuition can be explained with the following prisoners' dilemma game:
Suppose that player t is born in period t and lives for two periods, t and Ž . t q 1. In each period t, the old player player t y 1 and the young player Ž . player t play the prisoners' dilemma game. If we assume that every player observes the entire history of the game, then we can support an equilibrium in which everybody plays C when young and D when old. The Ž . strategy is as follows: i Play C when young and play D when old as long Ž . as this play has been observed; and ii play D both when young and old otherwise.
It is easy to see that the old player's strategy is optimal, because the action D is a strictly dominant action. The young player would like to play Ž . C if the past play has been C, D all the time because, by doing so, she can ensure a payoff of y1 for this period and a payoff of 2 for the next period. But if the young player deviated to play D, then she would get a higher payoff of 0 for this period but a lower payoff of 0 for the next period. Thus, as long as the discount factor ␦ is greater than 1r2, it is optimal to play C when young. On the other hand, if somebody in the past has deviated, then it is optimal for the young player to play D, because everybody will play D in every period. The reason that the young player Ž . cooperates i.e., plays C instead of the dominant action D in the equilibrium path is that she knows that, by not playing C, she will destroy the intergenerational cooperation in the future. Now let us change the assumption on the observability of the history. Assume that player t is only aware of the actions taken in period t y 1 when she enters the game. We now show that cooperation can no longer be sustained. Suppose that player t y 1 plays D instead of C when young. Ž Player t observes this deviation, but the following generations player . t q 1, player t q 2, and so on do not. Player t has two choices: play D as supposed, or ignore the deviation and play C instead. If player t plays D, Ž . then her lifetime payoff is 0, because the action profile D, D will be played in periods t and t q 1. But if player t plays C instead, then player t q 1 will assume that cooperation has been sustained in the past and play C in period t q 1. Thus, player t's lifetime payoff from playing C when young is y1 q 2 ␦ , which is greater than the lifetime payoff from playing D. Therefore, player t will play C even when she observes a deviation. Knowing this, player t y 1 will definitely play D when young. Therefore, cooperation cannot be sustained. The key to this result lies in player t's incentive. She does not want to pass the information of deviation to the next generation, because that will result in the breakdown of cooperation from which she will suffer. This in turn makes player t y 1 deviate when young.
In addition to the incentive to conceal a deviation, another kind of incentive results from limited observabilityᎏnamely, the incentive to fabricate a deviation. A player may pretend to have observed a deviation if he or she can benefit from doing so. These two incentivesᎏthe incentive to conceal a deviation and the incentive to fabricate oneᎏarising from limited observability, together with the special structure of the overlapping generations model, give quite tight restrictions on the repeated game equilibria. In Section 3, we first characterize necessary conditions that any Ž . repeated game equilibrium must satisfy Proposition 1 . Then, while re-Ž . stricting our attention to the case when only finite pure actions are Ž . Ž . allowed Assumption 2 , we apply the necessary conditions to generic games with a dominant action for the old player to prove that players play short-run best responses in every period along the equilibrium path Ž . Proposition 2 . Finally, we show that the same conclusion holds for 2 = 2 Ž . 3 symmetric games Proposition 3 .
Although the model in this paper is restricted in several ways, we feel that this is an important step toward understanding many economic and social phenomena. Our framework is particularly suited to explaining situations or institutions with high turnover rates, such as big cities. When people are constantly entering and exiting an institution, new entrants may not fully observe what has been going on, but instead have a limited observation of the recent history.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Main results are presented in Section 3. We present some counterexamples in Section 4 to show that the anti-folk theorem cannot be readily extended to more general games.
THE MODEL
This is a game played by overlapping generations. Each generation consists of one player who lives for two periods. We will call the player born in period t for t G 1 player t. In addition, there is the initial old Ž player, called player 0, in period 1. In each period t, the old player player . Ž . t y 1 and the young player player t play a stage game G. We will denote the sets of actions for the young player and the old player by A 1 and A 2 , 1 Ž 2 . 1 Ž 2 . respectively. A typical element of A A , resp. is a a , resp. . The Ž .
1 payoff for the young old, resp. player when the chosen actions are a and
a is u a , a u a , a , resp. . The sets A and A can be identified either as the sets of pure actions or as the sets of mixed actions, i.e., randomizations over the pure actions. In particular, we will not consider randomizations over the sets 1 is the previous sentence together with the statement in the assumption applied to players t G 2. 6 We assume that the discount factor ␦ is 1. Because players live for two periods, this specification only simplifies the exposition without changing the results.
We use the sequential equilibrium concept. 7 In this environment, the sequential equilibrium concept can be expressed in the following way. Note that we intentionally suppress the belief part of the definition. DEFINITION 1. A strategy profile is a repeated game equilibrium if 
MAIN RESULTS
It is clear that, in any repeated game equilibrium *, and for any t G 0 and h 2 ,
Ž . where BR и stands for the best response correspondence. Now let * be an equilibrium, and suppose that player t y 1 deviates in period t y 1 Ž . sequential equilibrium, we have
where the terms with the superscript d are the terms corresponding to the deviation and the terms with the superscript * are the terms under the 7 Ž . For a precise definition, see Kreps and Wilson 1982 . 
Ž . Observe that h
s h and h s a .
equilibrium play. This inequality can be rewritten in a simplified form as
Ž . Inequality 2 implies that player t must respond to any profitable deviation by player t y 1 and punish player t y 1 sufficiently so that the overall gain from deviation is nonpositive for player t y 1. However, because player t is the only player who observed player t y 1's deviation, she may not want to punish player t y 1 if the cost of doing so is excessive. Instead, player t may pretend to have observed an equilibrium play of player t y 1 by simply choosing action 1U rather than action 1 d . In this t t case, player t q 1 must believe that the equilibrium strategies have been played throughout the history. Thus, giving a proper incentive to the punisher requires
On the other hand, it is also possible that player t behaves as if she has observed player t y 1's deviation even though player t y 1 did not in fact deviate. Preventing this incentive to fabricate a deviation requires
For the remainder of this section, we assume that the action sets A 1 and A 2 are finite. Thus, we do not consider mixed actions.
ASSUMPTION 2. The sets A 1 and A 2 are finite.
We now give our second result. This result not only is interesting in itself, but also is used heavily in the proof of Proposition 3. 
which cannot be satisfied generically when 1U / 1 d .
Q.E.D. t t
Proposition 2 is applicable to any game with a dominant action for the old player, either symmetric or asymmetric. In particular, for the prisoners' dilemma game, the only repeated game equilibrium is the one in which every generation deviates in every period. To see what we mean by ''genericity,'' consider the following general prisoners' dilemma game, where g ) 0 and l G 0:
The conclusion of Proposition 2 does not hold only when 1 q g s l. In Ž . other words, Eq. 5 is satisfied only when 1 q g s l. Our next result concerns 2 = 2 symmetric games. dominant action for the old player, which leads to a contradiction of our initial supposition as before.
Q.E.D.

COUNTEREXAMPLES
The conclusion of Proposition 3 cannot be readily extended to more general situations. We provide counterexamples in this section.
Ž
. EXAMPLE 1 Mixed Actions . This is a chicken game. In this example, Ž . play N when old as long as this play has been observed, and ii play N when young and play D when old, otherwise. First, observe that N is a Ž . EXAMPLE 2 2 = 2 Asymmetric Games . The game is L R U 0, 0 1, 1 D 10, y5 2,y10 Ž . The equilibrium strategy profile is i play U when young and play R Ž . when old as long as this play has been observed, and ii play D when young and play L when old otherwise. The reader can verify that this is indeed a repeated game equilibrium. The essence of this example is that the punisher gets a high payoff from punishing. Also observe that D is a strictly dominant action for the young player. Ž . The equilibrium strategy profile is i play A when young and play B Ž . when old as long as this play has been observed, and ii play C when young and play C when old otherwise. Again, the reader can easily verify that this is indeed a repeated game equilibrium.
